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On March 31, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the landmark case
of Padilla v. Kentucky that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel in criminal cases includes the right for non‐U.S. citizens to be
correctly and specifically advised about the likely immigration
consequences of a plea agreement. The decision represents an important
shift in the way courts have addressed such claims by noncitizen
defendants. The Court’s decision recognizes a constitutional requirement
that defense counsel provide advice in an area of law in which few defense
counsel are knowledgeable, and therefore raises important and difficult
questions about how counsel can comply with these duties, especially in
the face of limited financial and human resources. The Court’s analysis
may also have broader and equally important constitutional implications
for limitations on the imposition of deportation and for the imposition of
non‐immigration related “collateral” consequences following convictions.
This Article explores some of those questions. It addresses some of the
challenges to implementing the Court’s decision, including the complexity
of the advice and representation it mandates and the realities of limited
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financial resources and expertise in the legal community on these issues. It
identifies some of the broader doctrinal and analytical questions raised in
the Court’s analysis, with an eye toward exploring some implications for
other possible constitutional limits on imposing removal as a sanction for
criminal activity and for the imposition of non‐immigration related
consequences following convictions. It identifies some ways that
thoughtful response to the decision in the short term can lay the
groundwork for developing best practices in the long run. Finally, it
situates this discussion in the wider question of the most appropriate legal
response to criminal activity by noncitizens, concluding that, while Padilla
represents an appropriate accommodation by the criminal justice system of
current immigration law regarding convictions, a better, more just legal
framework would return to the immigration system the flexibility and
discretion to respond appropriately and proportionately to convictions.

INTRODUCTION

O

n March 31, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in the landmark
case of Padilla v. Kentucky, that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases includes the right
for non‐U.S. citizens to be correctly and specifically advised about the
likely immigration consequences of a plea agreement.1 The decision
represents a fundamental—some say even revolutionary—shift in the way
courts have addressed such claims by noncitizen defendants: it went
against the precedent of every single circuit court of appeals that had
previously addressed the question of whether counsel had an affirmative
duty to provide such advice.2 By reading the range of defense counsel’s
duty of competence to include an area of law in which few defense counsel
are knowledgeable, the Court’s decision raises important and difficult
questions about how counsel can comply with these newly recognized
duties, especially in the face of limited financial and human resources. The
Court’s analysis may also have broader and equally important

1
2

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010).

See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different 26‐27 & n.114 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 308, 2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1666788 (detailing the decisions of ten federal circuits and seventeen state courts
that previously held that criminal defense counsel had no affirmative duty to advise about
immigration consequences). Among federal appeals courts, only the Second Circuit
questioned this outcome but it did not directly decide the issue. See Zhang v. United States,
506 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 189‐91 (2d Cir. 2002). The
New Mexico Supreme Court stood alone in squarely holding that affirmative advice was
required for any noncitizen. State v. Paredez, 2004‐NMSC‐036, ¶ 19, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d
799, 805 (2004). Justice Alito’s concurrence in Padilla refers to the majority’s “dramatic
departure from precedent.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring).
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constitutional implications for limitations on the imposition of deportation3
and for the imposition of non‐immigration related “collateral”
consequences following convictions.
One important aspect of the Padilla decision was the Court’s refusal to
apply the distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction to define the scope of representation required by the
Sixth Amendment in the case of deportation consequences.4 In other
words, the Court recognized the protections of the Sixth Amendment to
cover advice by criminal defense counsel about the immigration
consequences of a criminal proceeding, regardless of whether those
consequences might be characterized as direct or collateral.5 The Court
attempted to confine the scope of its opinion to “the specific risk of
deportation”6 because of the “unique nature” of that consequence, referring
to its severity, the fact that it has long been “enmeshed” with criminal
convictions, and “importantly,” that it has become “nearly an automatic
result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.”7
In reaching this dramatic conclusion, the Court first made a quieter but
in some ways equally surprising holding (though it did not arouse the
same level of consternation in the concurring or dissenting opinions). The
Court held that “as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may
be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty.”8 In short, the
Court recognized deportation for criminal behavior as a penalty that
results from criminal proceedings, something the Court had consistently
and steadfastly refused to do up until that point.9 For over one hundred
years, the Court had always described deportation as a civil, remedial
sanction, designed not to punish, but to remedy an on going violation of

3

Deportation is now referred to in the Immigration and Nationality Act as “removal.” See
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), div. C §§ 304, 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009‐546, 3009‐
587, 3009‐627 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). However, since “deportation”
remains the most commonly understood term to describe the phenomenon, I continue to use
it and will use the terms deportation and removal interchangeably in this Article.
4

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.

5

“We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.” Id. at
1482.
6

Id.

7

Id. at 1481.

8

Id. at 1480 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

9

See, e.g., Reno v. Am.‐Arab Anti‐Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (“Even
when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle the alien
is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available for that separate
purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted.”).
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the civil immigration law.10 This characterization has been the basis for a
number of important decisions limiting the procedural and constitutional
rights of respondents in removal proceedings.11 Padilla, in acknowledging
the penal nature of removal for criminal convictions, represents a
significant departure from these prior Supreme Court characterizations of
deportation.
These two holdings represent an important and fundamental
realignment in the way courts will need to address deportation
consequences in the criminal context. They are important because, as the
Court itself recognized, the shift brings the law into alignment with the
lived reality experienced by many noncitizens that deportation for many
crimes is a penalty—an automatic and particularly harsh one.12 They are
also important because of the severity of the deportation penalty and the
extent to which its worst impacts are often felt not only by the defendant in
a case but also by his or her law‐abiding family.13 At the same time, as
Justice Alito highlighted in his concurring opinion, there are significant
questions raised by the Padilla decision, notably including the challenges of
giving correct advice in an extremely complex area of the law and the

10 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding criminal
constitutional protections “have no application” in deportation proceedings because those
proceedings are civil in nature).
11 See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 700 (1998) (refusing to recognize risk of removal
as sufficient for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination in
deportation proceeding); INS v. Lopez‐Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039‐40 (1984) (refusing to
allow suppression of evidence for constitutional violations in deportation context); Li Sing v.
United States, 180 U.S. 486, 495 (1901) (same); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (refusing to apply
the constitutional protections of trial by jury and protections from unreasonable search and
seizure and cruel and unusual punishment in deportation proceedings); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (refusing to apply the
prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws to the exclusion context).
12 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. “Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants
facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult [to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context].” Id. For those convicted of any of the
broad range of offenses now considered “aggravated felonies” under immigration law, there
is a conclusive presumption of removability, and the conviction disqualifies them from any
discretionary relief in immigration court. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006) (“An alien convicted of an
aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.”);
Id. § 1228(b)(5) (“No alien [convicted of an aggravated felony] shall be eligible for any relief
from removal that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General’s discretion.”).
13 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484; see also Michael Falcone, 100,000 Parents of Citizens Were
Deported over 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A16, available at 2009 WLNR 2923612. See
generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF LAW ET AL., IN
THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST? THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO
DEPORTATION (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Human_Rights_report.
pdf.
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broader implications of the decision’s holdings and analysis.14 In short,
how can we implement the revolution brought about by Padilla?
This Article explores some of those questions. Part I addresses some of
the challenges of implementing the Court’s decision, including the
complexity of the advice and representation it mandates and the realities of
limited financial resources and limited expertise in the legal community.
Part II identifies some of the broader doctrinal and analytical questions
raised by the Court’s analysis. It first explores whether an attorney’s duty
to discuss collateral consequences extends beyond the realm of
immigration law that was addressed in Padilla. Part II then focuses on other
possible constitutional implications triggered by the Court’s use of the term
“penalty” in its discussion of removal. Part III identifies some ways that
thoughtful response to the decision in the short term can lay the
groundwork for developing best practices in the long run. Finally, the
Article poses the wider question of what is the most appropriate legal
response to criminal activity by noncitizens. It concludes that while Padilla
represents an appropriate accommodation of current immigration law by
the criminal justice system, a return to more flexibility and discretion in the
immigration system itself would be a better, more just way to ensure
appropriate and proportionate responses to convictions.
I.

The Challenges
A. The Difficulties of Advising Noncitizen Defendants

Given the previously unrecognized constitutional duty of criminal
defense counsel to advise about immigration consequences and the fact
that most criminal defense attorneys are not familiar with immigration law,
it is clear that there is a very large educational task ahead as a result of
Padilla. Unfortunately, this is not a challenge that can be met with a simple
round of continuing legal education seminars. Justice Alito, in his
concurring opinion, was certainly accurate in observing that providing
advice on the immigration consequences of a particular conviction “is often
quite complex.”15 Justice Alito detailed some of the difficulties of
categorizing offenses to determine whether they render a defendant
statutorily removable or not.16
The task is even more complex than Justice Alito described. Though
the most draconian consequences are often quite clear (like the fact that
those convicted of drug trafficking like Mr. Padilla are subject to automatic

14

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring).

15

Id.

16

Id. at 1488‐89 (discussing, for example, the struggle to categorize an offense as an
“aggravated felony” rather than a “crime involving moral turpitude”).
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deportation as “aggravated felons”), the implications of a conviction for a
“crime involving moral turpitude” or offenses in other categories can vary
according to: the current immigration status of a particular defendant; the
length of time she has held that status; the ability she might have to adjust
to another status; and the availability of relief from removal in immigration
proceedings. Even an individual who has never held legal immigration
status in the United States might be eligible for various forms of relief in
removal proceedings, eligibility that can be virtually extinguished by a
criminal conviction.17 Furthermore, some categories of removable offenses
have “triggers” that can be avoided, thus preventing a defendant from
becoming removable. For example, an offense of simple assault18 can be a
safe, “immigration‐friendly” plea with a sentence of under a year, but a
sentence of a year or more transforms the offense into an “aggravated
felony” for immigration purposes,19 resulting in automatic deportation.20
In addition, a defendant’s prior criminal history will affect the
consequences she will suffer as the result of a particular conviction. For
example, a permanent resident with no prior criminal history could safely
plead guilty to a misdemeanor theft offense, such as Maryland’s theft less
than $100,21 because although the offense is a crime involving moral
turpitude, it fits within the “petty crimes” exception to the ground of
removability.22 However, if she had a prior conviction for theft or any other
crime of moral turpitude, the conviction would render her deportable
under a separate provision for multiple convictions.23 Likewise, certain

17 For example, an individual with at least ten years of physical presence in the country and
who has a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident family member who would suffer
extraordinary and extremely unusual hardship if the individual were deported is eligible to
apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) but will be disqualified by any of a
number of convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Likewise, an individual who has a well‐
founded fear of persecution in her home country may qualify for asylum but will be
disqualified by a conviction for a “particularly serious crime,” a term of art in the Immigration
and Nationality Act. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
18 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3‐203 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (defining assault in
the second degree).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (including crimes of violence with convictions carrying a
sentence of imprisonment of at least one year in its definition of aggravated felony).
20

See id. § 1228(c) (“An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively
presumed to be deportable from the United States.”); see also id. § 1228(b)(5) (“No alien
[convicted of an aggravated felony] shall be eligible for any relief from removal that the
Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General’s discretion.”).
21 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW

§ 7‐104(g)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).

22

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (“Any alien who is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude . . . and is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed . . . is deportable.”).
23 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude . . . is deportable.”).
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misdemeanor convictions, such as simple trespass,24 are generally safe
pleas, in that they do not fall within the categories of convictions that can
result in removability; however, two such convictions would disqualify an
individual who was otherwise eligible for Temporary Protected Status (the
status granted recently to Haitians following the catastrophic earthquake in
their country).25
In addition to knowledge of the complex world of immigration law,
the task of taking immigration consequences into account when
representing a noncitizen defendant demands that criminal defense
counsel have both substantial knowledge of criminal law and considerable
creativity. Immigration implications should infuse every aspect of the
representation, beginning with what information is gathered at intake.
When engaging in plea negotiations and decisions about going to trial,
Padilla might now require counsel to explore alternative possible pleas that
are supported by the facts, including dispositions that may not be
considered convictions for immigration purposes and pleas to charges that
could avoid immigration consequences, such as regulatory offenses that
will not involve “moral turpitude.”
Sentencing is another area that provides ample opportunities for
constructive lawyering on behalf of a noncitizen client, especially where
certain sentences (even if suspended)26 can trigger the “aggravated felony”
category and its draconian consequences.27 For example, suppose that
during a plea negotiation on an assault charge the state insists on a three‐
year sentence. If the case involved an altercation with a number of
individuals who could be seen as victims, a creative defense attorney could
satisfy the state’s concerns and avoid the aggravated felony at the same
time by proposing a plea deal that stacks three separate charges of assault,
each with a sentence of 364 days, to be served consecutively. Alternatively,
counsel could recommend that an offer for a longer, suspended sentence be
declined in favor of a shorter sentence of “real” time that the defendant
will actually serve. These kinds of creative problem‐solving strategies
demand vast knowledge of possible alternative charges in the criminal
code and of the many permutations that can be found in criminal
24

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6‐402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).

25

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) may be granted to nationals of countries where the
Secretary of Homeland Security finds that such nationals cannot safely return to that country
because of natural disasters, armed conflict, or other “extraordinary and temporary
conditions” that make return unsafe. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). Individuals are disqualified from
TPS eligibility if convicted of two or more misdemeanors in the United States. Id. §
1254a(c)(2)(B)(i).
26

The INA provides that “[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence . . . is
deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law
regardless of any suspension.” Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
27

For a list of crimes considered to be aggravated felonies, see id. § 1101(a)(43).
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sentences. These strategies also require some finesse in negotiation with
prosecutors. Postconviction challenges and collateral review of convictions
are other areas of specialized criminal practice that are extremely
important to noncitizens in the wake of Padilla.
Few lawyers possess the requisite knowledge of both the immigration
and the criminal justice systems that is needed to represent noncitizen
defendants well.28 This does not mean, however, that we should throw our
hands up in despair of ever rising to the task, but rather that we need to
find ways to bring the expertise of the two bars together—to facilitate
collaborative consultation and co‐counseling. This is one of the profound
challenges of Padilla, especially in light of limited financial and human
resources.
B. Resource Challenges
The constitutional mandate of Padilla is, in a certain sense, the best
thing that could have happened to funding for the representation of
noncitizen defendants. This could be counterintuitive if Padilla is thought
of as creating an additional, substantial layer of required work for defense
attorneys, additional work that will strain already inadequate defense
resources even further. Padilla did not create the requirement, but rather
recognized an area of law about which defense attorneys already needed to
be advising their clients.29 The importance of this advice in providing
competent representation has been recognized by bar associations and in
other standards for many years;30 the widespread acceptance of these
standards was in fact one of the factors the Supreme Court relied on in
holding that such advice represented the standard of competent
representation in the legal community.31 In addition, training materials and
educational seminars have been widely offered in recent years.32
In Padilla, however, the Supreme Court raised the standard of giving
immigration‐related advice in criminal proceedings to the level of a
constitutional mandate. What had been seen by many as a “best practice” is
now a minimum standard of competent representation. What was
“collateral” is now integral to criminal defense of noncitizens. This is

28 Justice Stevens was surely understating the matter in Padilla when he stated that “some”
criminal defense attorneys “may not be well versed in” immigration law. Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
29

See id. at 1482‐83.

30

See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ET AL., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED
PERSONS (3d ed. 2004); see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
31
32

See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482‐83.

Id.; see also Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at app.13a‐35a, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08‐651).
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significant for the question of resources because it means that immigration‐
related advice must be funded like any other aspect of criminal defense.
This represents a fundamental shift in the thinking about immigration
consequences, and it will likely take some time for the culture and funding
of criminal defense to reflect the new reality. The implications of the
decision are nonetheless clear: immigration‐related advice is required; that
advice is complex and will require significant resources be devoted to it;
and those resources must be devoted.
Obviously, training is required for all legal actors in the criminal justice
system. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys need to know the
importance and implications of the issue to ensure both that defendants’
rights are protected and that guilty pleas remain secure. The Supreme
Court itself referred to the proper role immigration considerations could
play in the negotiation of a plea agreement.33 For this to happen, both
defense and prosecution must have an understanding of how immigration
issues could affect the result for a defendant.
The brunt of the burden, of course, falls on defense counsel, who has
the obligation to research and advise her client specifically about
consequences, as well as to advocate throughout the representation to
achieve the client’s express immigration‐related goals.34 As I have noted,
doing this requires significant resources, which can pose a challenge for
both publicly funded defense programs and clients of the private bar.
There are numerous models for instituting immigration advice in
public defender (“PD”) offices, including training programs, in‐house
expertise (either centralized or in local PD offices), and variations on a
contract model.35 Considerable thought has been given already to the
special challenges of providing such advice in the high‐volume, low‐
resource context of a PD office and to many of the practical considerations
in doing so.36 There are numerous partners, including local nonprofit
organizations, immigration specialty bar organizations, foundations,
fellowships, and law school clinics, that can support public defenders in
this effort so that strides can be made toward developing programs to
ensure full representation for every noncitizen, even in these financially
challenging times. Ultimately, though, immigration‐related aspects of
criminal defense must be funded no more or less than any other

33

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.

34

Id. at 1478.

35 PETER

L. MARKOWITZ, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER
IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN 10‐15 (2009), available at http://www.immigrantdefense
project.org/docs/2010/10_Public%20Defender%20Immigration%20Protocol.with%20appendice
.pdf.
36 See, e.g., id.; Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public
Defenders to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 572‐81 (2004).
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constitutionally mandated aspect of defense. In state‐funded programs, for
example, funding for immigration expertise must also be state funded.
Private defense attorneys must also insist on the “funding” of
immigration‐related representation for—and by—their paying clients. That
is to say, they must insist that their clients pay to obtain the immigration
expertise they need in order to be properly represented. Such paid
immigration expertise would ideally come in the form of a consultation by
the defense attorney with an immigration attorney. This format allows the
two attorneys to communicate directly about the issues at stake and
brainstorm about possible solutions that will satisfy both criminal justice
and immigration concerns.
Private clients may also independently consult an immigration
attorney, but this does not allow for the best communication between
counsel on the legal and strategy questions. Further, this practice runs the
risk that some crucial piece of information or advice will be missed,
resulting in an attorney giving erroneous advice. Some defense attorneys
also cultivate relationships with immigration attorneys whom they can call
for a quick, free opinion when an issue arises. This informal model is even
riskier than the independent consultation model. It involves a substantial
risk that the criminal counsel’s desire to keep exchanges brief and not‐too‐
burdensome for the immigration attorney will result in insufficient
attention to detail and bad advice. Given the complexity of the factual and
legal analysis needed to give good advice about immigration
consequences, this is truly an area in which a client is likely to get what he
or she pays for. Bar associations and other organizations can play a role in
facilitating bridge‐building between private criminal and immigration
attorneys by providing or facilitating training, networking events,
directories, and other tools for collaboration and referral.
Even more than financial resources, there is a crisis of human resources
in the need to provide immigration advice to criminal defendants on such a
wide scale. Simply stated, there are not enough lawyers in most parts of the
country who are knowledgeable about the immigration consequences of
crimes to provide all the advice required, even if the financial resources
were there to pay for it.37 Many attorneys in both bars have simply avoided
wading into this deeply complex area of the law. On the criminal side,
courts have told attorneys for years that immigration concerns were
“collateral” to the criminal proceedings and that they had no duty to
understand or provide advice on those issues. Many have avoided giving

37 See, e.g., Jojo Annobil, Supervising Attorney, Legal Aid Soc’y Immigration Law Unit, Oral
Testimony Before the New York City Council Immigration Committee on the State of
Immigration Services in New York City 3‐4 (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.legal‐
aid.org/media/8633/state_of_immigration_services_in_new_york.pdf (describing the lack of
immigrant legal services in New York City).
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advice in a laudable effort to avoid giving bad or insufficient advice. Even
among immigration attorneys, many avoid the complex area of the law
related to convictions. It is interesting to wonder whether part of this
aversion on the part of immigration attorneys to dealing with convictions
stems from the common demonizing of all immigrants as “law‐breakers”
in the public political imagination.38 It is certainly simpler to challenge that
misconception39 when one does not have to confront clients who actually
have broken the law in some way. Whatever the motivation, the reality is
that many immigration lawyers have historically avoided cases and clients
with criminal involvement.
Clearly, the first step is continuing legal education for both the criminal
and immigration bars, so that they can at least spot the issues and know
when it is time to call for help. In fact, these trainings are being offered all
over the country by national and local organizations and offices.40 It is a
slow process, however, and such training is more effective at preparing
generalists to know when they need to call a specialist than it is at training
specialists themselves.
The bar and the legal academy must take the lack of criminal‐
immigration specialists seriously and begin or expand programs designed
to produce attorneys with this expertise. Though there is a growing interest
in immigration law in both doctrinal and clinical law school courses, there
are currently very few courses around the country focused on the
intersection of criminal and immigration law, despite the intersection
clearly raising enough complicated and interesting issues to justify a full
course. Those of us in the academy must change that. We must increase the
offerings of both doctrinal and experiential courses addressing these issues,
ideally team‐teaching those classes with both criminal and immigration
faculty. In so doing, we will clearly be addressing an unmet need for legal
expertise in our communities. In addition, given the level of need, we will
also be doing our students a good turn, positioning them to step into a
growing and challenging area of practice, where they can become highly

38

See, e.g., The Wave (Sharron Angle, Candidate for U.S. Senate Oct. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIkNAA2y4I4 (“Waves of illegal aliens streaming across
our border, joining violent gangs, forcing families to live in fear.”).
39 There is substantial evidence that immigrants actually have a lower rate of involvement
in criminal activity than the U.S.‐born citizen population. See, e.g., Kristen F. Butcher & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Crime, Corrections, and California: What Does Immigration Have to Do with It?,
CAL. COUNTS (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., San Francisco, Cal.), Feb. 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/CC_208KBCC.pdf (concluding that U.S.‐born
adult men are incarcerated in California prisons at a rate two and a half times higher than that
of foreign‐born men and are involved in the broader range of institutions related to criminal
activity, including prisons, jails, and halfway houses, at a rate ten times higher than the rate for
foreign‐born men).
40

See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 32, at app.13a‐35a.
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sought‐after experts.
II. Questions About the Scope of the Decision
Padilla has already had a profound effect on the practice of law at the
intersection of immigration and criminal law and will undoubtedly
continue to do so. It has revolutionized the plea bargaining process for
noncitizens, an effect that will surely extend soon to sentencing and other
aspects of their representation in criminal courts. What remains to be seen,
however, is how far the Padilla revolution will extend and in which
directions. The decision includes language and analysis that have the
potential to work some fairly dramatic transformations in various areas of
the law. It will remain for scholars and courts to work through the
decision’s implications in the coming months and years.
One question regarding Padilla’s scope relates to the possible
application of the Court’s requirement of advice about consequences
traditionally considered “collateral” beyond the area of immigration law.
There is longstanding and vigorous scholarship on the broad range of such
consequences that can result from criminal convictions.41 This scholarship
has demonstrated that many of these consequences are applied as
automatically and without exception as deportation is in the case of
aggravated felonies. It also highlights that many consequences are quite
serious, such as indefinite civil commitment, loss of custody rights, loss of
voting rights, and loss of housing.42 Many commentators have
recommended reforms that would reduce the number of such
consequences, require notice before the acceptance of a plea agreement,
and provide a system for individualized relief from these consequences in
appropriate cases.43 The American Bar Association has issued Standards for
Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualifications, which
recommends that all such sanctions be incorporated into and taken into
account in the criminal process.44 The Uniform Law Commission has
drafted model legislation to do just that.45
It is no surprise that courts have already begun to consider whether

41

See, e.g., Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration
Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 55‐56 (2010). See generally Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues
Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006) (discussing the collateral
consequences of a conviction as they relate to the reentry of a formerly incarcerated
individual).
42

See Pinard, supra note 41, at 635‐36, 642.

43

See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 41, at 87‐89.

44 ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ET AL., supra
45 UNIFORM

note 30.

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 5, 6 (2009), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2009_final.pdf.
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other such consequences are included in the advice that criminal defense
counsel must provide to a defendant. The Supreme Court limited its ruling
in Padilla to immigration consequences and attempted to make a case for
the “unique nature of deportation” as a consequence in order to avoid just
such an expansion of the decision. Despite this holding, the Court’s
analysis seems to extend to at least some consequences beyond
deportation, where the nature of the consequence is serious, and it attaches
to a person automatically with a conviction.46 The Eleventh Circuit has
already relied on Padilla in a case involving erroneous advice by defense
counsel on the consequence of involuntary commitment as the result of a
sex offense conviction.47 It remains to be seen how far into the realm of
other “collateral” consequences Padilla’s ruling will extend.
Another area that is rich for exploration by scholars and practitioners is
the implication of the Court’s recognition that immigration consequences
can be part of the penalty imposed in a criminal case.48 This recognition
represents a breach in the wall between proceedings labeled “civil” and
“criminal,” which has led over the years to the conclusion by many courts
that immigration proceedings did not require many of the protections
traditionally afforded to criminal proceedings (even when those
immigration proceedings are the direct result of a criminal conviction).49
This breach in the wall reveals the conceptual distinction between
deportation for violation of civil immigration law and the conditions of
admission on the one hand, and for violation of non‐immigration related
criminal laws on the other hand. The exposure of this distinction, in turn,
could lead to a reconsideration of the question of the proportionality of the
sanction of removal for relatively minor crimes under the Eighth
Amendment, and generally of the question of whether there should be
some graduated system of penalties in immigration law analogous to that
found in criminal sentencing.50 Likewise, the recognition of deportation as
a penalty resulting from a criminal proceeding could affect the analysis of
whether a defendant can be subjected to deportation under a provision
enacted after she committed or was convicted of the offense, or whether
such an application would be considered an impermissible ex post facto
application of law.51 Additionally, there could be other implications for the
right to counsel in crime‐related deportation proceedings under the Sixth
Amendment. There is, of course, a long history of courts denying these
rights, but that history was grounded on the fundamental principle that

46

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481‐82 (2010).

47

Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).

48

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.

49

See supra notes 10‐11 and accompanying text.

50

See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 264 (2006).

51

See, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 2 at 16‐17.

366

v. 45 | 353

New England Law Review

deportation was not a penalty but a remedial, civil sanction.52 That
foundation has been severely undermined by Padilla.
III. Interim Responses Leading to Long‐Term Best Practices
As we begin to respond to Padilla’s mandate, we should give thought
to how our immediate responses can contribute to ensuring best practices
for the long‐term defense of noncitizens in our criminal courts. Thoughtful
response and planning in the short term can help determine whether our
long‐term response will be restricted by the limits of our current capacities;
whether we are able to ensure, ultimately, quality representation that
protects noncitizens in both criminal and immigration proceedings; and
whether we can approach the value underlying the Court’s decision in
Padilla: that deportation should only be imposed as a just and
proportionate response to serious criminal activity.53
Criminal cases involving noncitizen defendants continue to be heard in
our courts every day, despite the fact that many public and private
criminal defenders are not yet prepared to give adequate advice about
immigration consequences. There is a need to represent these clients
immediately, even as training and other programs for immigration
referrals and consultations are put in place. The greatest likelihood of
successful representation of noncitizen clients is with the collaboration of
all those partners currently engaged in the various fields, whose expertise
is required for this representation.
In recent years several national organizations have developed the
specialty of advising about the immigration consequences of convictions.
These organizations have developed both the expertise and procedures
required to respond to the real‐time needs of criminal defense attorneys,
and they provide an invaluable resource for individual attorneys and
programs trying to establish robust systems for immigration‐consequences
advice. They include the National Immigration Project of the National
Lawyers Guild,54 the Immigrant Defense Project,55 the Defending
Immigrants Partnership,56 and the Immigrant Legal Resource Center.57
These organizations provide immediate, individualized advice to defense
attorneys for the short term and, on a more pro‐active level, can help
defender programs to think through and plan for integrating immigration

52

See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481‐82.

53

Id. at 1480.

54 NAT’L IMMIGR.

PROJECT NAT’L LAW. GUILD, http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/
(last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
55 IMMIGR. DEF. PROJECT, http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/
56 DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS

(last updated Mar. 23, 2011).

PARTNERSHIP, http://defendingimmigrants.org/ (last visited Apr.

8, 2011).
57 IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ilrc.org/

(last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
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expertise into their offices. The Immigrant Defense Project and Professor
Peter Markowitz have published an extremely thoughtful protocol that
discusses many of the practical implications of trying to integrate
immigration expertise into defender offices with limited resources and
provides a variety of models for doing so.58
Other important partners for responding to this challenge are, of
course, local defense attorney organizations and bar sections, local
immigration attorney organizations and bar sections, and local
immigration nonprofits—especially those with expertise in representing
detainees (many of whom have criminal issues). Local chapters of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”) would be a good
place to begin to find attorneys with expertise in immigration
consequences, and the chapters’ pro bono coordinators may be interested
in working with public defenders to ensure access to quality advice.59 In
addition, the chapters’ members, and members of any state bar
immigration sections, would clearly have an interest in facilitating
consultations and referrals for clients who are able to pay.
Finally, law school immigration clinics could provide useful resources
and some interim support while public defenders work to tap into and
integrate immigration expertise. The University of California at Davis has a
clinic that has been assisting a local public defender office with
immigration advice for years. The Immigrant Defense Project also runs a
national hotline for defense attorneys that is partially staffed by law
students under supervision. The relative flexibility of the structure of most
law school clinics (which start with a new staff of law students every
semester or year) gives them a kind of nimbleness that could be suited for
responding to the sudden challenge posed by Padilla. Law students can
serve as a “force multiplier.” They can be trained and supervised to give
advice directly to defense attorneys, or they can facilitate consultations
with pro bono experts from the private and nonprofit immigration sectors
by ensuring complete intake information and doing preliminary research
(such as identifying the elements of the criminal provision at issue) before
passing the case along to the expert.
Once the proper partners for collaboration are identified, it is
important to begin to document the demand for services as well as the
results of such services. In the case of public defenders, this will require

58 MARKOWITZ, supra note 35. For another useful treatment of the particular challenges
facing public defender offices that try to address this issue, as well as strategic suggestions for
meeting those challenges, see Welch, supra note 36.
59 AILA’s Immigration Lawyer Search, AILA.ORG, http://www.ailalawyer.com (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011). AILA has a national pro bono office that can be contacted through their website.
See AILA—PRO BONO, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=15767 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011).
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them to collect information identifying the number of noncitizens among
the office’s clients and to store this information electronically or in some
other easily retrievable form. In most cases, a question utilized to identify
those not born in the United States or its territories will be a useful
screening mechanism.60 From there, an office should develop a more
thorough immigration intake questionnaire to identify those needing
immigration advice and to gather the information required to ensure that
the advice is accurate. At the end of a case, attorneys should compile
information on whether they successfully avoided negative consequences
or preserved immigration relief. These statistics will be useful in
advocating to state or private funders about the need for immigration‐
related criminal defense services and for the difference those services can
make.
Attorneys should also collect more specific information about results of
cases where possible, as these represent successful alternative pleas
devised by counsel, successful sentencing strategies, and analysis about the
consequences of state‐specific offenses. This information should be
preserved in a form that makes it accessible for future reference by other
attorneys. Many states already have charts of the likely consequences of
specific state offenses,61 and this information about alternatives and
strategies can be incorporated there to enhance the quality of the charts’
information and, presumably, of future advice to the states’ defendants. It
can also be used in the creation of other state‐specific practice advisories
and tools for defense attorneys, thus improving the quality of information
available to them in their practice.

CONCLUSION: THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE
Amidst the effort to provide good advice to noncitizen defendants
about the threat of deportation, it is important to remember that the
60 Although this question will not necessarily identify only noncitizens (as it would
encompass naturalized citizens, for example), it would identify the foreign‐born, for whom
further questions should be asked regarding citizenship and immigration issues. There are
concerns about the accuracy of information about immigration status gathered by intake
workers, but some of these concerns can be allayed by training the intake workers and
phrasing the question to introduce the context of ensuring good representation for purposes
of protecting noncitizens.
61 See, e.g., MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER & UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF LAW CLINICAL LAW
OFFICE, ABBREVIATED CHART FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTITIONERS OF THE IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS UNDER MARYLAND STATE LAW (2011), http://www.
law.umaryland.edu/faculty/Msweeney/ImmigrationConsequencesChart.pdf. For a selection of
state charts, see IDP Resources—Criminal Justice Advocates, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT,
http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/webPages/crimJustice.htm (last updated Mar. 8,
2010); Legal Resources, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT, http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.
org/legalresources.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
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ultimate concern should be justice in the imposition of immigration
consequences. That is, immigration consequences should be imposed to the
extent, and only to the extent, that it is just to do so. Ultimately, this
requires that immigration consequences be proportionate to any crime
committed and that a decisionmaker have the power to consider all factors
relevant to the momentous decision of whether to banish an individual
from her chosen home and, often, her family and community.
The Padilla decision provides an opening to move closer to the goal of
bringing the consideration of immigration consequences to the surface of a
proceeding designed to provide sanctions for criminal behavior. As such, it
represents an opportunity to re‐inject a modicum of fairness and common
sense into the way our law assigns immigration consequences to criminal
behavior. However, it does so by providing an opening for the criminal
system to essentially compensate for and sidestep the inflexibility and
disproportionate response of our current immigration law to crimes, and it
does nothing to remedy the flaws in that law.
Our law of immigration consequences for crime remains drastically out
of balance. For example, the current law provides no distinction between
the consequences of a conviction for premeditated murder and a conviction
for shoplifting, with a suspended sentence of a year.62 Both are considered
aggravated felonies and make an individual automatically deportable with
no relief and no opportunity to return, a kind of immigration “life sentence
without parole.”63 The range of aggravated felonies defined in the

62

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), (G) (2006) (defining both offenses as “aggravated felonies”).

63

8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (“An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively
presumed to be deportable from the United States.”). More generally, the law provides that
anyone convicted of an aggravated felony is removable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The law
specifically disqualifies individuals with aggravated felony convictions from seeking virtually
any relief under the INA, including:
Form of relief

Defined by:

Aggravated felons
prohibited by:

Cancellation of removal for
Lawful Permanent
Residents (LPR)

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)

Cancellation of removal for
non‐LPR

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)

Special Cancellation of
Removal for Central
Americans under
NACARA

8 C.F.R. § 240.66

8 C.F.R. § 240.66(c)(1)

Voluntary departure

8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1)

8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B)‐(C)
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Immigration and Nationality Act is broad indeed, encompassing
subsections A through U of § 101(a)(43) of the Act (many of which
represent categories of crimes—such as theft offenses or crimes involving
fraud or deceit—and many of which have several subparts) and
prescribing the same automatic consequences for each of the listed
offenses.64 Likewise, there is no leeway in the consequences of such a
conviction based on the individual and her level of integration into, and
connection with, the U.S. community. With an aggravated felony
conviction, there is no distinction between an individual who entered the
country illegally yesterday and one who is a lawful permanent resident
like Mr. Padilla (who has resided in the country for decades and has deep
family and community ties here, including honorable military service and
discharge); they are equally without recourse or remedy.65
Rather than require the criminal system to compensate for this
draconian and unforgiving statutory framework of consequences, it would
be far preferable to have a system in which the criminal courts are free to
focus on the just imposition of traditionally criminal penalties and the
immigration courts are granted the discretion to consider traditional
factors in determining whether deportation is a proper response to a
conviction.66 What is needed is reform of our statutory framework for
imposing immigration consequences to convictions, reform that would
restore to the system the discretion to consider all relevant factors in

Relief under battered
spouse provision of
VAWA

8 C.F.R. § 240.65(d)(2)

8 C.F.R § 240.65(d)(3)

Naturalization

8 U.S.C. § 1427

8 U.S.C. § 1427(d)

Temporary Protected
Status (TPS)

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)‐(b)

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)

The law bars such individuals from humanitarian relief from persecution in the form of
asylum and, in many circumstances, the more limited withholding of removal as well. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A)‐(C).
64 INA

§ 101(a)(43)(A)‐(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)‐(U).

65

The statute disqualifies an individual with an aggravated felony conviction from
cancellation of removal, the relief from removal otherwise generally available to lawful
permanent residents and in which a judge may weigh the severity of a criminal offense
against the applicant’s positive equities. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
66 Prior to 1996 when it was eliminated, the § 212(c) waiver was used in thousands of cases
to waive deportation for individuals who had been convicted of crimes. INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 296‐97 (2001). Like the current remedy of cancellation of removal, the § 212(c) waiver
allowed an immigration judge the discretion to weigh positive factors (such as community
and family ties, military service, hardship to the individual or family, and character) against
the seriousness of the offense for which an individual had become deportable. See id. at 294‐
95. Unlike the current remedy of cancellation, the § 212(c) waiver was available even to those
who had been convicted of aggravated felonies. See id. at 297.
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deciding whether to impose the sanction of deportation.
However, given the toxicity of the current national immigration
debate, it seems very unlikely that Congress will be able to address this
issue in any constructive way anytime soon. Even the Obama
Administration, which supports comprehensive immigration reform, has
targeted its enforcement efforts and rhetoric against “criminal aliens.”67 It is
hard to imagine that anyone in the current atmosphere will step forward to
champion the rights of this most politically powerless and reviled group.
For this reason, it will likely continue to fall to the courts to protect
noncitizens accused or convicted of crimes. Padilla is all the more important
in this context, as it and its progeny may identify constitutional mandates
that push the legislative branch in a direction that it needs to move but
cannot seem to move itself. We will watch with great interest—and hope—
to see the reach of Padilla in restoring some sense of proportionality and
justice to the intersection of our criminal and immigration law.

67

See Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal‐alien‐program (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). A recent webpage
posting by John Morton, Director of Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), sums it up well:
Here at ICE, we are tasked with enforcing immigration policies. But
the reality is, we have a limited number of Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) officers compared to the millions of individuals here
illegally in the United States. That’s why ICE, under the Obama
administration, has made a shift in its removal strategy. Removing illegal
aliens with criminal convictions is our top priority.
John Morton, Tough, Sensible Immigration Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/leadership/corner/ (follow
“November 24, 2010 | Tough, Sensible Immigration Enforcement” hyperlink).

